Delivery growth on Pyszne.pl and Uber Eats

The tooling. Pyszne.pl belongs to the same merchant family as the marketplace our partner restaurants trade on in the Netherlands, so the promotion types on offer, the way an item and its modifiers must be structured, and the merchant-side reporting exports are ones we already handle weekly. Uber Eats is a separate system with its own promotion catalogue, ranking surfaces and exports, and we treat it as separate rather than assume our familiarity carries over.

What does not transfer is a client list. Over six months our partner restaurants have averaged 40% more orders, the weakest of them up 30% and the strongest past 200% — and every one of them is in the Netherlands, not in Poland. We manage Pyszne.pl and Uber Eats storefronts remotely from Amsterdam, with account access you grant and can revoke.

Same kitchen, same food, two listings — and they rarely perform alike. The gap between them is the most useful diagnostic you have. If one converts well and the other does not, the fault is on the weaker page: item order, photography, descriptions, missing modifiers, a best seller buried below the fold. If both convert alike but one is seen by far fewer people, that is visibility — and visibility costs money where a rebuild does not.

So we read the two apart before spending anything. Then we rebuild both — in Polish that reads like a menu rather than a translation — and hold them in step afterwards, because storefronts built at different times by different people drift within months. Across the brands we have rebuilt, menu conversion has ended up at roughly twice what it was.

Not both. The two platforms rank storefronts differently and sell different ad products, so identical money buys different things. The test we apply to any spend is whether it produced orders that would not otherwise exist: an offer that moves a regular from one app to the other looks like growth on a dashboard and changes nothing in your kitchen.

The comparison we trust is what each storefront actually pays out, week by week, against the baseline we record before starting — gross order counts flatter both platforms equally. Read that way, the strongest storefronts we run have returned as much as 14x on ad spend, and the route there is usually subtraction: fewer offers, fewer hours, funded only where they produce orders.

More than the headline suggests. The two promotion catalogues are not the same shape, and commission lands on the discounted order rather than the full one — so an offer that is comfortably profitable on one storefront can quietly lose money on the other while both dashboards report a good week.

So every offer is priced against your own item margins before you see it. Each week you get a plan naming the platform, the items, the offer and what we expect it to do; you sign it off, change it, or say no, and only then do we execute it in your accounts.